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 On the assumption that bioengineers of various kinds are going to be tinkering with the 
human genome, I have sometimes wished that they would produce human beings endowed 
with a capacity to write excellent books on the ethics and politics of biotechnology.  I doubt they 
will come through, which leaves us with the books that appear “naturally.”  That this is not 
such a bad fate is proved by Yuval Levin, who has written a very good book without—if we are 
to trust his acknowledgements—performance-enhancing biotechnology.  Levin’s book turns on 
an expansion of the distinction between the influence that we exercise through a book, for 
example, over the thinking and acting of the next generation and the influence that we would 
exercise through “direct intervention in children’s bodies and minds.”  He argues that if we 
abandon traditional forms of education and influence in favor of technical alteration of 
biological capacities, we begin to undermine the structures essential to our self-government.  
Levin would say I ought to write by my own hand the book I would like to see rather than 
engineer someone else who could write no other. 
 Perhaps one day authors will introduce their books by crediting their parents’ genetic 
counselors or some technician at Amgen.  Levin follows the conventional path of identifying 
friends and teachers, and, for enriching life beyond the book, he acknowledges his “greatest 
fortune” is his family.  Books come and go in the grip of chance.  Insightful authors appear 
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whenever they do, and their books await an uncertain reception.  Readers and books 
themselves are somehow “hostages to fortune.”  Francis Bacon used this phrase about family—
to have wife and children is to give hostages to fortune—, and biotechnology is often presented 
to great rhetorical effect as the agent of our liberation from this worrisome situation.  If we 
genuinely love our children, should we not use any available power to make them as good as 
possible, rather than expose them to the vagaries of accident and misfortune? 
 One theme of Levin’s book is the question of whether there is greater benevolence in 
preparing a child or a student for achieving his own successes (while accepting the possibility of 
serious disappointments) or in precluding failure by designing and guaranteeing success—so 
far as it lies within our power.  Levin encourages us to admit we do not so completely grasp the 
contour of the good as to permit our engineering it into children, but neither is it wholly 
unknown.  In art, moral action, athletics, and so on, we both recognize excellence and are 
sometimes surprised by its shape.  This consideration should induce caution against too heavy a 
hand in making future goods depend on today’s artful interventions.  Moderation is another 
theme and perhaps the highest goal of Levin’s book. 
* * * 
 Imagining the Future may be conventional in its origins, but it breaks conventions by the 
manner in which it addresses the cliché-riddled and predictably binary public debates about 
biotechnology.  Levin rightly points out that in these debates the particular technique at issue is 
normally of secondary importance.  Disputes on embryonic stem cell research sound like lightly 
reheated, 1980s-era arguments over fetal tissue transplantation.  Levin’s focal point is not 
science itself or even technology, but science making its appearance as a cultural phenomenon 
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in non-scientists’ lives:  science “domesticated and democratized.”  He traces the origins of the 
debates (between what he calls the left and the right) about science to something more 
interesting than the difference between a secular, enlightened, pro-science view and a religious, 
benighted, anti-science view.  “The dispute between them . . . comes down most fundamentally 
to two quite different ways of thinking about the future, and that difference lies at the heart of a 
great deal of our political life, well beyond the science debates.”  For Levin, the science debates 
provide a lens through which we can focus on America’s political and moral life.  The left, he 
says, imagines the future in terms of an anthropology of innovation, while the right imagines 
the future in terms of an anthropology of generations. 
 “To imagine the future in terms of innovation means, most fundamentally, to imagine 
change in terms of new ideas, and to think of life as an array of individual experiments and 
choices.”  Liberals and libertarians favor this view.  “They share a faith in the processes that 
drive innovation and progress in a free society, and believe that impeding these processes, or 
even trying to control them in advance, will only make things worse.”  Dangers are best averted 
by trial and error led by personal choice left as unfettered as possible.  “Those individuals most 
directly affected by some new innovation will be best able to judge its value, and if they find it 
is harmful or not worthwhile, they will reject it.”  Progress must not be impeded simply because 
some may choose badly.  This logic, which informs our democracy, economy, and culture of 
individualism, has led to better prosperity than any alternative.  “Modern science and its 
progeny are agents of this kind of innovation, which is possible only in an environment that 
nourishes experimental liberty.”  As a result, those who embrace this line of reasoning are 
adamant in defending science from political regulation. 
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 Imagining the future in terms of generations means being concerned to preserve cultural 
achievements for transmission to the next generation.  “The most fundamental fact of human 
natality has always been that human nature emerges from the womb in essentially the same 
general form in every generation; or, as conservatives like to put it, that human nature has no 
history.”  Education is the unending task of protecting the civilized world from the constant 
assault of savagery in the form of children, and the right sees certain institutions (such as the 
family) as permanently necessary to every human community.  Other and perhaps higher 
projects are judged by reference to the primary need to perpetuate civilization.  Those on the 
right assess “each innovation not only by how it might enhance or degrade their own life, but 
also by how it might improve or diminish the ability of our society to raise and to tend to the 
next generation, and by its influence on the inheritance we could leave for the future.” 
 Levin claims that each of these ways of imagining the future offers “a rich and 
compelling anthropology of progress,” and he treats them with a kind of evenhandedness.  
Each has something true, but neither is “simply right,” and so they must be balanced.  Levin 
conveys the appearance of neutrality by devoting one chapter to each way of imagining the 
future in its complex relations with science, and yet he does not finally stand above the two 
alternatives as an impartial analyst.  While Levin endorses the anthropology of generations as 
offering “a fuller and more recognizable account of the truth of the human condition,” he shows 
no romantic longing for the past and credibly insists on openness to innovation.  By keeping our 
eyes on the next generation, he argues, we have a more reliable test for assessing the goodness 
of the new.  The left’s inherent defect is neglect of the fact and necessity of children.  Levin’s 
anthropology of generations points toward a recovery not of the past but of “the past’s way of 
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thinking about the future.”  Past generations made possible our self-governance, so we must 
preserve the same or better possibilities for coming generations. 
 In Levin’s view, science is both essential to our well-being and the source of grave 
threats to our political institutions.  The book’s first chapter deftly dismantles the thesis, widely 
embraced, that science is morally neutral.  And Levin deserves praise for penetrating and 
dismissing the “profound misunderstanding” that science moves too fast for ethics.  He shows 
that since its inception, modern science was conceived and presented to the public as a moral 
enterprise aimed at the relief of our estate, primarily by improving health.   We non-scientists so 
thoroughly presuppose science as our benefactor that almost no one notices that science so 
conceived is essentially subordinated to the service of moral goals.  Levin clearly lays out much 
of what ensues when this oversight becomes widespread:  any discussion of moral limitation on 
scientific research appears as an illegitimate attempt to impose idiosyncratic moral biases 
restricting thought and subsequent benefits to our health and welfare. 
 While I think Levin overstates the primacy of health for the founders of modernity, he is 
surely correct about its place in popular understanding.  It is unfortunate he did not go on to 
devote attention to the fact that once science is accepted as publicly authoritative, essentially 
beneficial, and not touched by moral presuppositions, all moral judgments tend to appear as 
idiosyncratic biases.  Ultimately, this creates a difficulty for Levin’s principle of moderation. 
 Levin recognizes that science has a corrosive effect on our confidence in the truth of 
moral judgment, and yet he thinks reintroducing “ancient ideals and traditions” will moderate 
the modern scientific project.  As he frames the issue, despite being a moral endeavor, science is 
“morally neutralizing” in the sense of “crowding out our means of moral reasoning and sources 
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of moral authority.”  He proposes that we somehow graft ancient wisdom onto modern political 
forms and guide science by a richer morality capable of securing modernity’s roots.  Levin’s 
analysis of the invention of modernity by people like Bacon and Descartes is, I think, 
insufficiently attentive to the hostility toward ancient wisdom ingredient to the moral reasoning 
in which Descartes enveloped science in his Discourse on the Method.  That said, because 
contemporary political life does not embody Baconian-Cartesian principles in their purity, 
Levin’s moderating strategy may indeed be possible in practice. 
 Still, the obstacles are considerable.  Descartes used the standard of scientifically 
rigorous certainty to cut through opinions of every kind.  All moral principles fell under that 
pressure.  Descartes then offered the useful portions of his reasoning to the public in part 
because he thought we might have an appetite for its advantageous fruits (as distinct from the 
science itself), and he ironically suggested that in doing so he was obeying a moral law to 
benefit mankind.  We seem to have taken his bait and accepted the consequences:  what science 
establishes is true and beyond the realm of legitimate dispute; morality is a matter of opinion, 
but not wisdom. 
 Levin’s confidence that we can import a traditional, moral wisdom to guide science does 
not fit easily into this bargain. 
To understand nature takes ever-growing knowledge.  To understand man takes 
the wisdom of the ages.  That wisdom, as it builds, can be informed by scientific 
knowledge, but it can never be replaced by it.  Science is a tremendously effective 
and powerful means of gaining knowledge about nature, and knowledge of nature 
is very important.  But human beings and human societies are more than mere 
objects of nature, and so science alone cannot suffice. 
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Many will interpret Levin’s claim that human beings are more than objects of nature as mere 
opinion.  Another opinion—a scientifically informed and sophisticated opinion—says the 
opposite.  Science may be neutral to the distinction between these opinions, but Levin’s opinion 
suggests we can know something that is undiscoverable by science.  Many scientifically minded 
people regard that as superstition.  And so when Levin speaks of supplementing science and 
guiding it, or even setting society’s course by “that other great modern force, public opinion, 
itself informed by a wide array of wisdoms,” we must admit that public opinion is not 
knowledge but “a force” and that it is informed not only by wisdom. 
 The tendency of science to erode moral beliefs is addressed in the last two substantive 
chapters of the book, which are entitled, “Science and the Left” and “Science and the Right.”  He 
presents science as threatening moral principles in different ways for each, with the left facing 
much more serious difficulties for its own coherence.  Whereas the left comes forward as a 
rational, anti-religious, anti-traditional movement aiming to maximize individual freedom, the 
right understands itself not as an alternative but a corrective.  The right embraces much of the 
left’s interest in freedom and progress, but it remedies the left’s central error of failing to 
provide for the next generation’s needs.   
 Levin finds two central tensions in the left’s relation to science.  First, modern science 
aims to master nature, but the left has also embraced a reverential and moralistic attachment to 
preserving nature, reconceived passively as “the environment.”  The left seems blind to the 
conflict between their suspicion of the powerful (nations, corporations, and the wealthy) and 
their embrace of the science that generates all that power.  Second, science presents a challenge 
to the left’s attachment to equality.  Science “involves on the one hand a weakening of the case 
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for human equality, and on the other a positing of ends and purposes taken to be higher and 
more important than equality.”  Levin documents the left’s trouble resisting eugenic impulses 
both early in the twentieth century and more recently through prenatal screening.  If we openly 
abandon attachment to equality, now exposed and discredited as mere prejudice, we 
fundamentally alter our political institutions. 
 The left aligns itself with science so closely that it often overlooks the threat science 
poses to its ideals.  In contrast, the right recognizes science as a consistent threat and so is prone 
to overreact against it.  Assaults on evolutionary science may make the right seem to be what 
the left says it is, viz., intellectually and morally warped by “ignorant theology” or “retrograde 
anti-rational obscurantism.”  Levin tries to resolve the core issue swiftly by asserting, as if it 
were non-problematic, that in addition to science there is a “different realm of human 
knowledge.”  “Nothing about being an American requires one . . . to accept the dubious 
proposition that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge relevant to the question of human 
beginnings.”  Surely this is true as a claim about citizens’ responsibilities, but one must admit 
that modern biology just is the attempt to account for life through a “purely material 
description” without appeal to soul.  On this view, mind either is not a part of nature, or it is 
nothing but the brain.  Modern science is understood in many ways, but it tends toward two 
poles:  materialist reductionism (in which case, it flatly denies Levin’s “different realm of 
human knowledge”) or empiricism (in which case, whatever is true beyond the observable 
phenomena remains outside our knowledge). 
 Levin regards the right’s occasional overreactions against science as much less 
significant than a second danger:  the erosion of moral principles or taboos that follows upon 
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our bringing them to light in order to defend them.  Especially in bioethics, by trying to defend 
the sacredness or dignity of life, death, sex, birth, and the body we expose to the harsh light of 
public debate intimacies that need protection with veils, shadows, or silence. 
The taboo—part sacred, part unclean—is above all kept out of reach and common 
view.  Its rationale is generally not laid out in detail.  We have a sense that deep 
wisdom is embedded in the prohibition, but that it is better not to unravel it in 
public.  Our most fundamental implicit moral sentiments, which guide us but are 
themselves best left shrouded, surround and protect our deepest taboos. 
 These sentiments and insights are reasonable but not fully rational.  They 
are wise but not explicit.  We can approach them with arguments but never fully 
contain them. 
 
Levin appeals to Edmund Burke at some length in support of the superiority of inarticulate 
taboos over rational argument.  Levin nonetheless recognizes that taboos are imperfect guides 
and insufficiently clear for setting policy in a modern democracy.  As a result, conservatives 
must argue in favor of what the taboo protects. 
The trouble is not that it is hard to do this.  Very often, there are sound and serious 
arguments to support an old intuition, and these can be marshalled and wielded 
quite effectively.  If something is wrong, it is wrong for a reason, and the reason 
can be reached by argument. . . .  The very act of defending taboos in the public 
arena requires us, in a limited but highly meaningful way, to transgress them—or 
at least to uncover them in ways that undercut them.  
 
Taboos are the non-rational support for rational prohibitions, and taboos are needed not 
because morality is not rational, but because human beings are not always rational.  The effort 
to make what the taboo protects non-mysterious by fully bringing to light its rationality 
removes the taboo’s power over us even though this unveiling is not an unmasking that shows 
there is nothing beneath the veil after all.  There is a reason for the taboo, but knowing the 
reason, we are no longer awed by the taboo. 
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 Levin is normally quite clear, but an important lack of clarity emerges once one reflects 
on his gift for using speech to reinvigorate feelings of awe, sacredness, and even humility or 
shame before the realities he exposes in thoughtful speech.  He says speech reduces or hinders 
these feelings, but his own words evoke them.  He addresses reverential rhetoric to people for 
whom reverential silence is a nearly forgotten possibility.  The tension between what he says 
and does raises a question about the role of reason in morality.  Sometimes he presents rational 
argument as a poor substitute for “moral intuitions and untouchable sentiments,” and 
sometimes he presents it as the solid core of morality, surrounded by inherently unreliable and 
possibly unjust moral sentiments.  Again, is morality essentially reasonable (although it stands 
in need of support from the right kind of feelings because we are not always guided by reason), 
or is there necessarily a loss of innocence for those who look behind the curtain to see why 
something is good or bad?  A friendly request for greater clarity seems in order. 
 Finally, I draw attention to a difficulty within his discussion of dissecting taboos and 
providing reasoned arguments in their place. 
Strong as they are, and they can be strong indeed, arguments are finally not a fully 
satisfactory substitute for moral intuitions and untouchable sentiments.  
 In our time, on most issues and especially in the science debates, 
conservatives neither have nor desire to have recourse to such mysticism.  And so 
they must argue, knowing they are doing away with the foundations of the old, 
and as they do so struggling to construct new foundations—shallower but 
hopefully firm—before the structure topples over.  
 
The Cartesian metaphor here embodies the assumption that philosophical reason should be 
responsible to construct the moral order for the benefit of mankind.  To assume this is to 
embrace modernity at its most immoderate and to abandon the possibility that nature (which is 
simply identifiable neither with reason nor with sentiment) provides the root of moral order. 
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 The deepest question raised by Levin’s book is, then, the character of modernity.  On 
Levin’s view, while the right emerged and exists as a reaction to the left, the left itself emerged 
“in response to a new set of ideas and intellectual possibilities that burst onto the European 
scene in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—ideas and possibilities that we now think of 
as modern scientific thought.”  With these words Levin suggests a merely accidental connection 
between modern science and modern political thought.  Science emerged to serve the appetite 
for health and bodily goods; at about the same time, the left brought forward modern political 
forms to serve the appetite for individual freedom, and the power that came from science 
happened to be usefully at hand.  Accordingly, he speaks of “crosspollination between the new 
politics and the new science” and of their being mixed together rather than of their being 
conceived together as parts of a single project.  While Levin never makes it completely clear 
how he understands the relation between modern science and modern political thought, he 
does seem to need them to be separated for his ultimate aim of embracing modern science while 
moderating it with ancient wisdom. 
* * * 
 Many recent books assemble essays on biotechnology from multiple authors, 
presumably in order to overcome the narrowness of point of view that might afflict a work by a 
single author.  Given that Descartes, modernity’s architect, said he found greater perfection in 
works composed by a single master than in those produced by many, it is interesting that books 
on so quintessentially modern a topic regularly take this form.  If we compare Levin’s book 
with Biotechnology:  Our Future as Human Beings and Citizens, edited by Sean D. Sutton, it is 
difficult not to side with Descartes and, hence, Levin.   
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 The seven essays in Sutton’s volume are drawn from a 2004 to 2005 lecture series at 
Rochester Institute of Technology.  The contrast between Levin’s unified analysis and this 
many-headed creature is pronounced.  The authors in Sutton’s book display almost no 
agreement as to what deserves attention, and only Richard Sherlock directly engages the other 
essays.  Some authors do cite a 2003 paper by Leon Kass, published in New Atlantis as “Ageless 
Bodies, Happy Souls” and reprinted here in a slightly edited version (a fact acknowledged 
nowhere in this volume).  In the remainder of this review, I would like to use two essays from 
Sutton’s volume to shed further light on Levin’s. 
 First, in “Who’s Afraid of Posthumanity?”—Ronald Bailey’s enthusiastic and uncritical 
endorsement of what he calls biotechnical miracles—we see an expression of the obstacle 
confronting Levin’s moderating ancient wisdom.  Many authors, as Levin noted, see that 
objections can be made in the name of equality against some biotechnology as threatening to 
yield a sort of biologically determined caste system.  Bailey dismisses these objections as 
“nonsense,” on the grounds that political equality does not presuppose or require “actual 
physical and mental equality.”  “The ideal of political equality arose from the Enlightenment 
insistence that since no one has access to absolute truth, no one has a moral right to impose his 
or her values and beliefs on others.” 
 On the one hand, this sort of claim is so thoroughly commonplace that it almost seems 
self-evidently reasonable, and not only to the left.  We are so accustomed to moral skepticism 
and the privatization of judgments about the good that we hardly notice the dogmatism 
(“insistence”) embedded in such declarations.  Bailey feels no need to justify the claim to know 
that others cannot know.  Somewhere, Descartes is smiling on this perfect display of the 
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corrosive effect of science on moral judgment.  Science itself, as the standard for knowledge, 
seems to establish that Levin’s moral knowledge does not exist. 
 On the other hand, it is stunning that this thesis does not strike Bailey as self-defeating, 
or even as questionable.  In this he exhibits the pronounced thoughtlessness on moral things 
that ensues once we deny the existence of moral knowledge.  He is not alone.  Deference to 
science and retreat from the responsibility of moral judgment are so embedded in our lives that 
many fail to notice the absurdity lurking in the inference from moral skepticism to a moral 
prohibition.  No one knows what is good or bad, and therefore it is absolutely bad to hold 
anything as truly good.  People who embrace this view submit to moral strictures imposed by 
Enlightenment thinkers even as they deny the legitimacy of anyone’s imposing moral strictures. 
 Bailey seems to withdraw all this in the next paragraph:  “In any case, the ideals of 
democracy and political equality are sustained chiefly by the principle that people are 
responsible moral agents who can distinguish right from wrong and therefore deserve equal 
consideration before the law and a respected place in our political community.”  According to 
the thesis quoted above, our equal capacity for moral discernment could only be an equal 
inability to discern truthfully.  Thus, what looks like an endorsement of moral thinking is 
actually a reassertion that no moral judgment is simply true.  The prior thesis nullifies this one 
and preserves the distinction between objective science and merely subjective moral opinion.  
Levin is not unaware of Bailey or of this position, but he did not engage this obstacle directly.  
One need not be as hardened as Bailey to find Levin’s appeals to moral knowledge a little too 
easy. 
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 Second, for reasons he does not explain, Levin chose to avoid substantive consideration 
of religion or theology, a noticeable absence that seems more significant in the light of Sutton’s 
book.  At one point, Levin refers to “the deep moral wisdom at the heart of our civilization—by 
which most Americans live their lives.”  Several authors in Sutton’s volume recognize in 
various ways the prominence of religion or theology in our debates about morality and science, 
and this seems to be the one point where Sutton’s collection surpasses Levin’s book.  To have 
addressed this would lengthen and complicate Levin’s work, but to focus on America’s moral 
and political life and, simultaneously, not to confront this dimension of our rhetorical situation 
is to have elided over essentials. 
 In “A Transcendent Vision,” Richard Sherlock argues that theology is not only 
circumstantially relevant but indispensable to public debate on biotechnology because it alone 
offers a standard for judgment once we push beyond nature.  “The problem for the western 
moral tradition is that if the claims of ‘redesign’ are even possible then it would appear that we 
can no longer rely on nature itself as a complete and sufficient basis of moral theory.”  When 
nature cannot guide, we must turn to “transnaturalism, that is, theology.”  Sherlock’s solution is 
less compelling than his question:  what is the moral reference point for evaluating the 
emergence of beings that are not human as we are?  Levin argues that for conservatives and 
liberals the distinction between good and bad derives from conditions that would no longer 
obtain if we controlled the biology of our offspring.  The children would be constructed 
according to moral principles that would not fit their being constructed.  The principles come 
from a world where nature is fixed, and the children would inhabit a world where human 
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nature is constructed.  The attempt to use theology to remedy this difficulty should interest 
Levin. 
* * * 
 Even in the light of these substantive difficulties, I wish to reiterate that Levin’s is a very 
good book.  He writes elegantly and insightfully on matters of substance.  He demands and 
rewards a thoughtful consideration of his argument, which is regularly graced with suggestive 
formulations.  One immediately recognizes the influence of his teacher Leon Kass, but Levin’s 
book is not simply Kass recast, if you will forgive the phrase.   Also, despite the fact that most of 
the book has appeared previously in essay form, he has structured his work here into a coherent 
whole.  As he says in the introduction, he has written a small book on a large topic; without 
pretending to say everything, he aims to point toward the core.  Levin has succeeded admirably 
in giving us much food for thought by addressing his subject at a depth most writers avoid.  
Finding a quarrel at this level increases rather than lessens one’s appreciation of this excellent 
book. 
 
